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palavras-chave 
 
Cominicações veículares, segurança, detecção e monitorização de intrusões, 
pote-de-mel (honeypot) 
 
resumo 
 
 
Esta dissertação descreve um estudo de viabilidade para a implementação de 
um software do tipo pote-de-mel (honeypot) para comunicações veículares 
Ad-Hoc sem fios baseadas no protocolo WAVE (Wireless Access in Vehicular 
Environment).  
Um honeypot é uma ferramenta desenhada para simular falsas redes de 
computadores, monitorá-los, e capturar todos os eventuais 
comportamentos maliciosos tais como ataques e tentativas de intrusão.  
O estudo da solução proposta começa com uma pesquisa de trabalho 
relacionado e com o estudo dos fundamentos e protocolos das comunicações 
veículares sem fios, nomeadamente os protocolos IEEE 802.11p e IEEE 
1609.2.  
De seguida é feito um levantamento dos principais problemas de segurança 
no âmbito das comunicações veículares sem fios e procede-se a uma 
descrição detalhada da tecnologia de honeypots e é escolhida uma 
ferramente que irá ser alvo de particular atenção ao longo desta dissertação, 
o HONEYD.  
Finalmente, e dado que esta dissertação tem um caracter iminententemente 
teórico, são descritas as modificações que serão necessárias para adaptar o 
HONEYD para comunicações veículares sem fios. Isto para o caso de 
comunicações veículo a veículo, onde é descrita a integração do HONEYD na 
unidade de bordo (OBU) e para o caso de ce comunicações veículo a 
infraestrutura de beira de estrada, onde é proposta uma solução para 
integração do HONEYD na road-side-unit (RSU). 
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Vehicular communications, security, intrusion detection and monitoring, 
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abstract 
 
This dissertation is an attempt to implement the honeypot 
software into highly dynamic Vehicular Ad-hoc Network (VANET).This ad-
hoc network is based on wireless communication between nodes 
according to the - WAVE (Wireless Access in Vehicular Environment) 
protocol. A honeypot is a tool designed to simulate fake local computer 
networks, monitor them, and capture all malicious behavior aimed 
towards them. This dissertation is in the scope of Intelligent 
Transportation Systems (ITS) and it provides some contributions to 
development of security system and hence, road safety. 
Honeypot solution implemented in VANET would help  improve
security in the network by attracting, catching and analyzing all malicious 
attempts to break the security system. 
The study of proposed solution begins with research and 
introduction to the main principals of vehicular communication. It is 
accompanied with system and wireless communication technology 
description. Presentation of main security issues is also provided.  
Honeypot software is also presented by deep in-sight look into its 
types, functionality, architecture, advantages and disadvantages. Via the 
research the one type of recent available honeypot is chosen and then 
deeply scrutinized on the basis of implementation into Vehicular Ad-hoc 
Network. 
Finally, since this dissertation has theoretical character, to-be 
changes that should be carried out to implement fully the propose solution
are provided. 
As this work is mainly focused on tailoring and proposing 
necessary changes to the TCP/IP honeypot software to meet the 
requirements of WAVE, the hardware tests in real environment as well as 
creating source code will not be done and are out of scope of this 
dissertation. Future work should be based on programming necessary 
modules and putting them into life.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
słowa kluczowe Komunikacja pomiędzy pojazdami, bezpieczeństwo, wykrywanie włamań 
do sieci, honeypot 
streszczenie 
 
Poniższa praca magisterska jest próbą przystosowania programu 
typu honeypot do działania w mobilnych sieciach ad-hoc - VANET 
(Vehicular Ad-hoc Network). Sieć ta oparta jest na bezprzewodowej 
komunikacji pomiędzy pojazdami zgodnie ze standardem WAVE 
(Wireless Access in Vehicular Environment). Honeypot jest narzędziem 
służącym do symulowania topologii sieci komputerowej, monitorowania 
jej i wychwytywania wszelakich prób włamań do niej. Temat tej pracy 
magisterskiej mieści się w obszarze działalności stowarzyszenia ITS 
(Intelligent Transportation Systems). Będzie ona miała wpływ na 
polepszenie bezpieczeństwa w sieciach VANET i co za tym idzie 
bezpieczeństwa na drogach. 
Program honeypot wdrożony w sieciach VANET może w aktywny 
sposób przyczynić się do poprawienia bezpieczeństwa w sieci, poprzez 
przyciąganie, wychwytywanie i analizowanie wszelakich prób włamań.  
Praca ta zaczyna się przeglądem głównych zagadnień 
dotyczących bezprzewodowej komunikacji pomiędzy pojazdami w 
sieciach VANET. Szczególny nacisk jest kładziony na bezpieczeństwo w 
tych sieciach. 
Zaprezentowana jest również idea programu honeypot zarówno 
jak i jego rodzaje, funkcjonalność, architektura oraz wady i zalety. 
Poprzez analizę dostępnych programów służących jako honeypot, został  
wybrany jeden konkretny - honeyd i poddany dokładnej analizie pod 
kątem implementacji w sieciach VANET.  
Jako że ta praca magisterska ma charakter teoretyczny, jej 
wynikiem jest propozycja funkcjonalności i architektury urządzenia 
działającego jako honeypot w sieciach VANET. Zaproponowane są
również zmiany którym powinien ulec software aby zapewnić pełną 
komunikację z nowym środowiskiem. Stworzenie kodu źródłowego
odpowiadającego tym zmianom oraz testy na sprzęcie są pracą na 
przyszłość. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
 
 
Wireless Access In Vehicular Environment (WAVE) is a recent, 
innovative technology on the basis of wireless communication. It is designed to 
provide communication between nodes in Vehicular Ad-hoc Network (VANET). 
VANET is a network created by vehicles on the roads and devices installed 
along them. This new type of ad-hoc network was introduced mainly to meet 
demands of Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) which scope is to increase 
safety on the roads and to decrease the air pollution by introducing into 
vehicular traffic modern technologies. 
VANET being mainly wireless environment is highly prone to many types 
of attacks or dishonest behaviors. One of the biggest challenges of WAVE is to 
provide security of communication. This is achieved so far by many solutions: 
keying material, certificates distribution or encryption. However, it has been 
proved that in many situations it is possible to deceive the security system. 
Intruders are equipped with more and more powerful tools to break the security 
mechanism. VANET has to have also powerful own countermeasures to fight 
with them because the reliability of communication via air link has an utmost 
significance. 
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The common solution known from the computer networks which gives 
the security system advantage over the intruder is the honeypot. It is a software 
used to deceive intruders as well as to reveal theirs tools or hacking methods 
what is immensely helpful in immunizing the security system. 
The current work is based on analysis of the honeypot solution and 
verification whether the implementation of the honeypot software is possible in 
vehicular environment. 
1.1. Motivation 
 
As our common world is based to the huge extent on modern 
technologies like computers, Internet, and recently more and more developed 
wireless communication; it is highly open to wide range of threats. Intruders 
have many possibilities to interfere our lives causing much harm. All modern 
technologies have to be properly secured disabling intruders to obtain  illegal 
access to its resources.  
Implementation of wireless access into road conditions gives many 
possibilities to improve overall performance of traffic. However, being not 
secured properly can lead to disastrous effects, like putting health or life of user 
at risk, not saying about revealing confidential data, like credit cards number.  
Motivation of this dissertation is to contribute in creation of powerful tool 
to improve the security system of WAVE and hence, contribute to increasing of 
safety on roads, decreasing number of data theft, accidents, deaths and any 
other road disturbances. 
1.2. Objectives 
The main objective of this dissertation is to study deeply the relatively 
new topic of WAVE technology in the VANET, focusing mainly on security 
aspects and honeypot implementation possibilities. Objectives of this 
dissertation can be enumerated in following way: 
 
1. Study background of WAVE and VANET 
2. Study honeypot software 
3. Design architecture of Vehicular Honeypot 
4. Chose the appropriate honeypot solution to be implemented 
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5. Propose necessary changes to make the implementation into WAVE 
possible 
1.3. Dissertation Structure 
 
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows:  
The second chapter is a background providing principals about WAVE, 
VANET and security oriented issues.  
The third chapter is a honeypot case study - research about the honeypot 
software, its features and recent available solutions.  
The fourth chapter is a presentation of main assumptions of Vehicular 
Honeypots followed later in the dissertation.  
The fifth chapter is a deep study of honeyd – open source TCP/IP 
honeypot chosen to be implemented. 
The sixth chapter is a core of the dissertation being a challenge to make 
the chosen honeypot software meet the requirements of WAVE. 
The seventh chapter is a future work and conclusion being the outcome 
of this dissertation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
\ 
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Chapter 2 
Background 
 
 
 
2.1 Intelligent Transportation System 
 
Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) is an enterprise which aims to 
implement wide range of technologies (wired and wireless) into - generally 
speaking - transportation systems. It is designed to cope with most common 
problems of nowadays vehicular communication and additionally provides wide 
range of new opportunities, and what is even more important – improves safety. 
Thanks to ITS, following improvements can be implemented into road 
infrastructure: 
 
• Arterial Management   
• Freeway Management 
• Transit Management 
• Traffic Incident Management 
• Information Management 
  
• Crash Prevention & Safety
• Emergency Management
• Commercial 
• Road Weather Management
• Electronic Payment & pricing
• Intermodal Freight
• Roadway Operations & Maintenance
• Traveler Information
 
And into vehicles themselves:
 
• Collision Avoidance
• Driver Assistance
• Collision Notification
 
Elements of ITS, its structure
figure: 
 
 
 
 
Vehicle Operations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[31] 
 and all improvements are presented in below 
figure 1: Elements of ITS [31] 
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All of these improvements have a purpose to deal with the biggest 
problem in terms of road communication - traffic congestion. It is a common 
problem as being the product of technological development, motorization, and 
growing human population. ITS by efficient traffic managing also copes with 
second problem which is associated with urbanization - air pollution. By 
optimization of routes and decreasing congestion, it reduces fuel consumption, 
what results in reducing of gas production.[28] 
ITS enhances safety on the roads, decreasing the number of accidents 
and deaths. It also reduces time of travel what is associated with reduction of 
traffic congestion.[26] 
 
ITS addresses many modern technologies, however this dissertation is 
focused on wireless communications only 
 
 
2.2 Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks 
 
Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) are an instance of ITS. This 
technology forms mobile networks based on nodes which are either in motion or 
remain stationary. The main goal of VANET is putting into life all assumptions of 
ITS. Mutual communication between nodes (road users or infrastructure) 
provides fluent information exchange what contribute to increasing of road 
safety.  
Infrastructure can also serve a role as a gateway to the Internet what 
additionally will, increase usability of this type of network – the time spent in 
traffic jam will be no more wasted [29]. 
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2.2.1 Wireless Access In Vehicular Environment (WAVE) Technology 
 
Communication in VANET is mainly based on WAVE technology – 
Wireless Access In Vehicular Environment. The WAVE system, based on a 
group of IEEE standards, is a radio communication system intended to provide 
seamless, interoperable services to transportation. These services include 
those recognized by the U.S. National Intelligent Transportation Systems  
Architecture and many others contemplated by the automotive and 
transportation infrastructure industries. These services include vehicle-to-
roadside (V2R) as well as vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) wireless communications. 
WAVE standard family defines: architecture, model of communication, 
security system, physical access and management structure of VANET. 
 
The general aim of WAVE is to provide interoperable wireless 
networking services for transportation. [5] 
Additionally, it provides:  
1. Traffic information:  
• whether condition,  
• road condition,   
• traffic congestion 
• location of road facilities (hotel, eating zones, gas stations) 
2. Traffic warnings: 
• car accidents 
• unforeseen incidents on the road 
• local whether breakdown 
• sharp bends 
• illicit crossing the crossroad on the red light by other car 
• sudden breaking of the car in front of warning receiving car   
• lane change warnings 
 
3. Possibility to pay charges (highway tolls, gas) automatically – tolling 
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4. Car service points with information about general technical condition of 
nearby traveling vehicles   
5. Easy video – audio transmission 
6. GPS maps actualization 
7. Services, like police forces with possibility to 
• Maintain surveillance 
• Distribute speed limit warnings and pull-over commands 
 
Taking into consideration the most appreciated advantage of WAVE and ITS 
- increasing safety on the roads, WAVE contribute to it by: 
 
1. Immediately send warnings to all vehicles concerned about dangerous 
events 
2. Taking control over vehicle by on board computer system in sudden and 
fast-reaction-needed situations 
 
These all advantages can be fulfilled due to cooperation between vehicles 
and road infrastructure. V2V communication is an automobile technology 
designed to exchange of messages containing useful information between 
vehicles without participation of any other entity. V2R is oriented on gaining up-
to-date information from roadside unit. 
 
This cooperation makes possible a range of applications that rely on 
wireless communication between road users, including vehicle safety, public 
safety, commercial fleet management, tolling, and other operations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
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2.2.1.1 WAVE standards 
 
 
WAVE technology is specifically described in following standards: 
 
 
 
figure 2: WAVE Radio Stack [5] 
 
 
IEEE 1609.1-2006 - Trial Use Standard for Wireless Access in Vehicular 
Environments (WAVE) – Resource Manager specifies a wireless access in 
vehicular environments (WAVE) dedicated short-range communications 
(DSRC) application, known as the WAVE resource manager (RM),designed to 
allow applications at remote sites to communicate with OBUs, through RSUs. 
The WAVE RM, acting like an application layer, multiplexes the communications 
of multiple remote applications, each communicating with multiple OBUs. The 
purpose of the communication is to conduct information interchange, needed to 
implement the requirements of the remote WAVE DSRC applications. [4] 
IEEE 1609.2 -2006- Trial Use Standard for Wireless Access in Vehicular 
Environments (WAVE) - Security Services for Applications and 
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Management Messages defines secure message formats, and the processing 
of those secure messages, within the DSRC/WAVE system. The standard 
covers methods for securing WAVE management messages and application 
messages, with the exception of vehicle-originating safety messages. It also 
describes administrative functions necessary to support the core security 
functions. [5] 
IEEE 1609.3 -2007 - Trial Use Standard for Wireless Access in Vehicular 
Environments (WAVE) - Networking Services defines network and transport 
layer services provided to WAVE device and systems, including addressing and 
routing, in support of secure WAVE data exchange. It represents roughly layers 
3 and 4 of the OSI model and the IP, UDP, and TCP elements of the Internet 
model. It also defines Wave Short Messages, providing an efficient WAVE-
specific alternative to IPv6 (Internet Protocol version 6) that can be directly 
supported by applications. Further, this standard defines the Management 
Information Base (MIB) for the WAVE protocol stack. [4] [30] 
 
IEEE 1609.4 -2006- Trial Use Standard for Wireless Access in Vehicular 
Environments (WAVE) - Multi-Channel Operations provides enhancements 
to the IEEE 802.11 Media Access Control (MAC) and physical layer (PHYs) to 
support WAVE operations in context of multi-channel communication. 
Specifically, the multi-channel operation (channel coordination) provides 
mechanisms for prioritized access, channel routing and coordination, and data 
transmission. [30] [7] 
Additionally, the WAVE 1609.X standards rely on IEEE P802.11p – IEEE 
Draft Standard for Information Technology -Telecommunications and 
information exchange between systems - Local and metropolitan area 
networks - Specific requirements - Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access 
Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) specifications Amendment 7: 
Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments 
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This proposed standard specifies extensions to IEEE 802.11 MAC and PHY 
that are necessary to provide wireless communications in vehicular environment 
on the basis of Dedicated Short Range Communication.  
 
The 802.11p amendment to IEEE 802.11 std. gives support to wireless 
local area network in vehicular environment. The main challenge of this 
standard is highly dynamic environment. 
 
The first significant amendment introduced by IEEE 802.11p is the 
possibility of direct communication between two stations without necessity to 
belonging to any BSS (Basic Service Set). Those stations stay in the so-called 
“WAVE mode”. The frames being transmitted or received have to contain 
wildcard BSSID value. The STA (station) can transmit the data frame outside 
the BSS only if dot11OCBEnabled is set to ‘true’ (STA`s MIB - management 
information base – attribute within MLME - MAC Layer Management Entity). 
Otherwise, when dot11OCBEnabled attribute is set to ‘false’ or is not present in 
MIB – these situations are equal – the STA does not belong to any BSS. It 
allows for immediate data frames exchanges due to the fact that the 
authentication, association, or data confidentiality services are not used in this 
mode. 
When dot11OCBEnabled is ‘true’, sending STA sets the BSSID field to 
the wildcard BSSID value. This mode is designed for safety messages in 
VANET environment which desires low latency and directness. 
 Next amendment which aims to improve performance of the environment 
is providing of WAVE BSS. It discards any authentication and security 
mechanisms leading to a reduced overhead for the WBSS setup. Such services 
(mostly security) are provided by upper layers as described in 1609.x std. family 
Decision about joining the WBSS is made, based on the received beacon 
with all necessary information and configuration. The whole process of joining 
the WBSS is simplified basically by giving or not, a response to the WBSS 
advertisement. 
Additionally, stations in WAVE mode cannot join infrastructure BSS or IBSS. 
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Termination of WBSS is dependent on a number of members, if it is 
none, WBSS finishes its existence. However, if the initiator of WBSS ceases its 
participation in WBSS, it can still exist.  
Passive and active channel scanning is abandoned.  
The PHY of 802.11p is based on 802.11 Orthogonal Frequency Division 
Multiplexing (OFDM) for the 5 GHz band with few enhancements. The PHY 
uses reduced clock/sampling rates – half clock mode with 10 MHz bandwidth 
what affects parameters like: bandwidth, carrier spacing, symbol length and 
frequency. It improves overall performance like making signal more robust 
against fading. 
Following changes of course require changes in data packets frames and 
primitives as described in 802.11p amendment. [19] [8] [9] 
 
 
 
 
2.2.1.2 Dedicated Short Range Communications  (DSRC) 
 
 
 
 
figure 3: DSRC System architecture [10] 
 
 
DSRC is a technology which provides communication services for V2R and 
V2V operations. It is characterized by high data transfer rates and small latency.  
DSRC uses a 5.9 GHz frequency with bandwidth of 75 MHz and an 
approximate range of 1000m. Vehicles can move with speed not exceeding 140 
km/h. 
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In compliance with DSRC standard the dedicated frequency for V2V and 
V2R  communication is in range of 5.855-5.925 GHZ. This band is divided into 7 
channels, 10 MHz each. The first one (172) is dedicated for safety messages 
transmission and has the highest priority. [25] 
 
 
 
 
figure 4: DSRC Channel allocation [10] 
 
 
The Bit Rate used within this standard widely differs depending on types 
of messages and range of communication. According to [20], Bit Rate used in 
the case of safety messages varies from 6Mb/s to 21 Mb/s. The maximum 
range for safety messages is more or less 300 meters. This length should be 
sufficient for drivers to take actions against the danger. According to [21], the 
time for proper reaction should be more or less 10 seconds. 
Concerning highways and a car traveling with average speed of 
120km/h, the distance of 300 meters takes the car about 9 seconds. 
However, in densely jammed condition where cars are traveling closer to 
each other and slower there is no reason to maintain range of 300 meters. It 
decreases to 15 meters as only the closest vehicles would be interested in the 
event on the road. 
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figure 5: DSRC Bit Rate and Range [20] 
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2.2.1.3  System Overview 
 
Protocol Stack 
 
 
figure 6: Protocol Stack [32] 
 
 
The stack consists of two planes: 
Data plane – communications protocols – LLC, IPv6, UDP/TCP and WSMP 
(WAVE Short Message Protocol) – and hardware used for delivering data 
between applications and management entities. 
Management plane – system configuration and functions providing 
management services. There exist specific entities for each of layers: PLME – 
Physical Layer Management Entity. MLME – MAC Layer Management Entity 
and WME – WAVE Management Entity which is treated as a more general 
collection of management services. The management plane uses data plane to 
passing management traffic. Management services include for example: 
application registration, WBSS registration, channel usage monitoring or IPv6 
configuration.  
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Services provided by IEEE 1609.4 are used to enhance the performance 
of MAC layer by providing management of channel coordination and by 
supporting MAC service data unit (MSDU) delivery. It also take care of channel 
routing and user priority. 
 
MLME and PLME management entities, MAC and PHY are widely described in 
802.11 with enhancements introduced by IEEE 1609.4 and 802.11p standards. 
 
WAVE MAC (802.11p) is designed to support two different protocol stacks IPv6 
– delivered only on Service Channels and WAVE Short Message Protocol 
(WSMP) which can be sent on any channel and allows immediate exchange of 
information without necessity to belonging to any WBSS. 
The WAVE networking services (IEEE 1609.3) provide LCC, network, 
and transport layer functions. 
All communication is secured by the security system deploying 
mechanisms like authentication or certificates verification, as described in 
IEEE1609.2. 
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System Architecture 
 
 
figure 7: System Architecture [11] 
 
 
WAVE system involves many different types of entities. In day-to-day 
operations, the following entities are the most active: 
 
Providers — Units that provide services on one or more service channels. 
 
Users — Units that consume services offered by providers. 
 
Roadside Units (RSUs) — Stationary WAVE devices located at the roadside. 
They support information exchange with OBUs. RSUs are typically embedded 
in infrastructure elements such as road signs and traffic signals; they may be 
moved from one site to another but do not operate when in motion. Providers 
will usually be RSUs. RSUs are licensed by site and may provide services on 
one or more service channels. 
 
On-Board Units (OBUs) — WAVE devices that can operate when in motion. 
They support information exchange with RSUs and other OBUs. OBUs are 
typically embedded in vehicles though they may also be portable (hand-held). 
OBUs operate in private vehicles, and a major goal of the security protocols in 
his document is to enable them to operate without violating a driver’s 
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reasonable assumptions about personal privacy. OBUs will usually be users, 
but may be providers in certain cases. 
 
An important subset of OBUs consists of: 
 
Public Safety On-Board Units (PSOBUs) — Network nodes embedded in 
public safety vehicles. These nodes are permitted by the relevant authorities to 
operate particular public safety applications such as traffic signal prioritization. 
 
In addition, the following entities support security services: 
 
Certificate Authorities (CAs) — Entities that are able to authorize other 
entities via the issuance and revocation of certificates. [5] 
According to [5] CAs should be widely spread around some geographical 
terrain, being responsible for smaller regions each. The main role of CA is to 
manage the identity of nodes which are registered and authenticated in  a given 
region. CA provides nodes with certificates (identity of owner and public key) or 
revokes them, as well as, distributes certificates of nodes which are moving into 
jurisdiction of other CA. Without this operation nodes managed by different CAs 
can not interact witch each other. 
 
 
 
 
Communication Protocols 
 
WAVE technology provides communication on behalf of two protocols stack: 
Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) and a remarkably new and designed for 
purpose of WAVE – WAVE Short Message Protocol. The IPv6 networking 
protocol is determined to work within Service Channel (SCH) while the WSMP 
has been designed to work within both SCH and Control Channels (CCH). 
However, the WSMP is designed restrictive to WAVE – aware devices. The 
uniqueness of this protocol is based on possibility of direct controlling the 
physical– layer parameters, such as: transmit power, data rate or channel 
number by the application residing on device. Additionally, within WSMP the 
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MAC address of the receiving destination is carried, including the possibility of a 
broadcast address. WSMP has been developed to meet the demands of highly 
dynamic environment. Hence, it is designed to decrease the overload and 
latency. It is reached by possibility of that protocol not to attending a WBSS 
while working on CCH Additionally, the new low – overhead packet format has 
been developed: 
 
 
 
figure 8: WSMP packet [24] 
 
 
WSM Version - is the number of the supported version of WSMP 
Security Type - carries the information whether the packet is Unsecured, 
Signed or Encrypted.  
Channel Number, Data Rate and TX Power  - are used to direct control of 
parameters of physical layer. 
PSID – Provider Service ID identifies the application that will process the WSM 
Data.  
Length – informs receiving destination about the number of bytes in the WSM 
Data 
 
In the case of WSMP the overhead is just 10 bytes. 
In comparison, the IPv6 datagram overhead consists of IPv6 header and 
TCP or UDP header (more likely used in WAVE) . 
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Source IPv6 Address
128 Bits
Destination IPv6 Address
128 Bits
Payload Length
16 Bits
Next Header
8 Bits
Hop Limit
8 Bits
Flow Label
20 Bits
Traffic Class
8 Bits
Version
4 Bits
0 7 15 23 31
 
figure 9: IPv6 header  
 
 
 
 
 
figure 10: UDP header 
 
 
 
Together, overhead for UDP packet within IPv6 header is 48 bytes long. 
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Channel Types 
 
WAVE distinguishes two types of communication channels: a single CCH 
and multiple SCHs. Commonly, WAVE devices operate on CCH, listening to 
high–priority applications and low latency WSMP system control messages. The 
device can switch to SCH if necessary. This is done, if device decides to join 
the WBSS. This enables the data exchange between applications located on 
devices associated to the same WBSS. 
However, while transmitting data packets on the SCH, a device is still 
required to monitor the CCH channel in so-called ‘control channel intervals’ 
(CCH intervals). This is required because single channel devices (devices that 
can work only on one channel at a time)  have to be able to operate high - 
priority safety or private service advertisements (send only on CCH) any time 
with high probability. WAVE devices shall continuously monitor the CCH when 
not synchronized to UTC (Coordinated Universal Time). [7] 
 
 
 
WAVE Basic Service Set (WBSS) 
 
WAVE devices can communicate with each other in two ways: in context of 
WBSS or directly to each other using the WSMP on the CCH. Association to 
WBSS enables applications to use either WSMs or IP traffic on the SCH 
associated with that WBSS. 
WBSS is announced in the air and all devices with corresponding application 
set can decide to join it.  
There are two types of WBSS: Persistent WBSS which is announced 
periodically what makes it suitable for providing general Internet access and 
non-persistent WBSS which is announced once, on WBSS initiation. 
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Threat model 
 
VANET faces wide range of threats concerning malicious attacks. 
In creating efficient and safe security system the awareness of every 
potential malicious attack together with their effects is a crucial thing. 
 
1. Internal (ECU, internal components of car) [1] [3] 
 
Targets 
The targets of attacks are the internal components of car (Engine Control 
Module, Electronic Brake Control Module, etc. [18] 
 
Desired results 
Forcing abnormal behavior of components or taking control over them 
 
Way to obtain access 
1. By physically inserting a hacking device in the car and gaining access to 
internal network of vehicle via the ubiquitous OBD-II port (On Board Diagnostic 
port). 
2. By wireless interface - OBU 
 
Danger 
Putting driver and passenger’s life or health at risk  
  
Attack Methodology 
1. Packet Sniffing and Target Probing. 
2. Fuzzing (Fault injection) 
3. Reverse-Engineering 
 
 
 
 
 
2. External – OBU and RSU 
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Target 
Users of road – OBU and Road Side Units 
 
Desired results 
1. Forcing desired behavior of road users 
2. Obtaining secret information 
3. Spying 
 
Way to obtain access 
1. By wireless interface of OBU or RSU 
2. Via the Internet 
3. By physically inserting a hacking device in device and plugging it to OBU 
or RSU  
 
Danger 
Losing privacy and anonymity of users, traffic chaos  
 
Attack Methodology 
1. Internet originate attacks 
2. Via wireless interface 
 
a) Sybil Attack 
b) Bogus Information 
c) Denial of Service (DoS) 
d) Impersonation (Masquerade) 
e) Alteration Attack 
f) Replay Attack 
g) Illusion Attack 
 
3. Messing with security ciphers and algorithms  
 
       a) Fault injection. 
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Generally, the IEEE 1609.2 [5] in Annex F provides classification of intruders 
who can jeopardize communication in the network: 
 
• Class 1: Has a radio transmitter/receiver but no keying material. 
• Class 2: Has a valid OBU or RSU. 
• Class 3: Has extracted the keying material from an OBU or RSU, 
allowing them to either pretend to be that OBU or RSU in multiple 
locations simultaneously, or force the revocation of that keying material. 
• Class 4: Insider at an organization with security administrative functions 
(HSM manufacturer, CA, vehicle manufacturer, government, etc.). 
 
Every class of intruders has different threat possibilities. Class 1 equipped 
with radio transmitter is able to replay or tunnel the legitimate messages. Class 
2 can broadcast fake messages or sabotage protocol stack connections. It can 
also be used to imitate fake services that could enable intruder to obtain secret 
information or track some device (in the case of RSUs the threat of being 
tracked can be omitted). Class 3 intruders with keying material can simulate 
physical device that can cause communication chaos. The biggest area of 
threat is the inside intruder which can gain access to many secret information 
like private data, keying material, certificates and so on. 
All RSUs and OBUs have to be fully secured against all of these type of 
intruders because the effects of breaking into any node could be disastrous. 
Additionally, in contrast to OBU, RSUs create widespread, wired network 
connected to many remote entities like certificates centers or servers with 
Internet resources what cause that this network is much more vulnerable.  The 
threat is based on taking control over Resource Manager within RSU which 
manages all communication (commands and data) flow between remote 
Resource Manager Applications and Resource Command Processor within 
OBU. What is more, without proper security systems, intruders once obtained 
illegal access to a RSU can possibly reach every part of the network and control 
even remote nodes of it. It can lead to terrible harm for entire network. 
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2.3 Security In Vehicular Communication 
 
WAVE can open many opportunities and bring to life many services, 
however it is also prone to attacks. Implementing WAVE into everyday life, 
security issues have recently gained much consideration. Many solutions like 
cryptography or certificate issuing have been used but any of them are perfect 
and completely sufficient to cover all security – oriented problems. Despite 
using these solutions, many messages are still prone to  being forged or 
replayed. IEEE 1609.2 std. [5] gives example of threats against  the 
BasicSafetyMessages (messages conveying information about road 
conditions). They can be used to track a private car and unfortunately security 
solutions proposed in this standard  does not address this threat 
 
2.3.1 Aims of Security System 
The vulnerability of many WAVE entities and confidentiality of most 
information and messages used or send by WAVE are sufficient reasons to 
maintain security system. Actions have to be undertaken to prevent the system 
from being attacked in different ways such as: message capture, 
eavesdropping, spoofing, alternation, spam or replay. 
In addition, the highest possible privacy of users of the system has to be 
enforced. Security systems should enable to use system anonymously, without 
threat of being traced. The user should not be personally linked with the WAVE’ 
messages. 
Generally, the main aim of security system in WAVE is to provide:  
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1. Confidentiality  
 
Provided by encrypting messages for a specific recipient in a specific way that 
only recipient can decrypt and read its content, what prevents from message 
capture or eavesdropping by third party. 
 
 
2. Authenticality 
 
Provided by confirmation of origin of the message, what prevents from 
accepting incorrect message content caused by altering the message during the 
transit. 
 
3. Integrity  
 
Provided by confirmation that a message has not been altered in transit, what 
prevents from accepting incorrect message contents caused by altering the 
message during the transit. 
 
4. Anonymity 
 
Provided by minimizing storage of a personal data which can uniquely identify 
vehicle, his owner or its position, what prevents from revealing vulnerable 
personal information.  
What is even more important, it prevents association in the case of 
multiple messages. 
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2.3.2 Cryptographic Methods 
The purpose of cryptographic algorithms is to encode messages, 
generally, to present then in a form that it can be readable only for the recipient 
of the message. The action of changing original message (called plaintext) into 
secure, encoded form (called ciphertext) is called encrypting. The reverse 
action, which enables a recipient of the message to decode the ciphertext to a 
readable version is called decrypting. The most common way to get the 
ciphertext is to use a special secret key. Usually the same key is used for 
decryption and that is why the key should be known only to two entities: sender 
and recipient.  
This algorithm is called symmetric key ciphers. The algorithm, which 
implements two different keys is called asymmetric key (public key) cipher. 
 
2.3.2.1 Symmetric Encryption 
 
Symmetric encryption is the cryptographic mechanism based on usage of 
one key to both encrypting and decrypting. In one hand it is the biggest 
advantage of this cipher but on the other hand it is the main weakness.  
This shared secret key, may be a subject to discovery by an adversary 
and must therefore be changed periodically. The generation of new keys, 
commonly carried out using a pseudo-random-number generator must be very 
carefully executed because, unless properly initialized, such generators may be 
not properly secured against key discovering. The new keys must then be 
distributed securely, preferably by using a more secure (but also more 
computationally intensive) asymmetric key cipher. 
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The whole process of encrypting and decrypting looks as follows: 
 
 
 
figure 11: Symmetric Encryption [34] 
 
 
In a process, two and only two entities are concerned – A and B. Both 
know the same secret data, known as a key. To provide confidentiality, A uses 
the key to encrypt message, whereas entity B, who knows the same secret key, 
uses it to decrypt cipher text. 
To provide authenticity and integrity, A uses the same or a different 
key to generate a cryptographic checksum or Message Integrity Check (MIC) on 
the message. B, who knows the same authentication key, can check the MIC. 
The MIC will only pass the check if the message and MIC have not been altered 
in transit.  
 
A message may be encrypted only, authenticated only, or both encrypted 
and authenticated. In the latter case, it may be first encrypted and then 
authenticated, or first authenticated and then encrypted 
 
The inner mechanism to “scramble” plain text into cipher text (Block 
Cipher Encryption) includes: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Firstly (to 
the 2002 year), mechanism called: Data Encryption Standard (DES) was 
followed.  
DES uses 64-bit plaintext blocks and a 56-bit key, whereas AES uses 
128-bit blocks and keys of size between 128 and 196 bits.  
Longer secret keys are obviously more secure, but the size of the data 
block also plays a role in the security of the cipher. The DES cipher follows the 
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approach of Feistel which has aim to create ciphertext in 16 rounds of 
implementing Feistel function. Soon, it turned out that the security in DES 
mechanism, provided by the 56-bit key is weak. In effect, DES was replaced by 
AES mechanism which does not use a Feistel function. Instead, it is based on 
substitutions and permutations, with most of its calculations being finite-field 
operations.  
 
AES Algorithm 
 
AES algorithm uses blocks of 128-bit plaintext and implement three 
possible key sizes of 128, 192, or 256 bits. The higher number of bits in key 
implicate higher number of iterations:  
 
Key lengths Rounds 
128 10 
192 12 
256 14 
 
table 1: AES keys 
 
AES encrypts all 128 bits in one iteration in contrast to DES where only 
32 bits were encrypted. This is one reason why it has a comparably small 
number of rounds. The 128-bites block undergo an encryption process in a form 
of 4x4 array called the state (S with byte elements si,j (0 ≤  i, j ≤  3). As it is 
previously stated, whole array is transformed and modified in each of the 
iterations. The final cipher text is also of 128 bytes size. Each round of the 
encryption process, with exception of the first, consists of three so-called layers.  
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figure 12: AES Algorithm [2] 
 
 
Key Addition layer – XOR operation between the state and round key obtained 
from Key Scheduler 
 
Byte Substitution layer – Each byte of the state array undergoes a nonlinear 
transformation with 256 possible outcomes stored in lookup tables which has 
been designed to resist simple attacks. This introduces confusion to the data, 
i.e., it assures that changes in individual state bits propagate quickly across the 
data path. 
 
Diffusion layer – It provides diffusion over all state bits and consists of two sub-
layers: (both implementing linear operations): 
• The ShiftRows layer permutes the data on a byte level. 
• The MixColumn layer is a matrix operation which combines (mixes) 
blocks of four bytes. 
 
In the first round only Key Addition is performed. In rounds 2-8 ( for 128 byte 
size plaintext ) Byte Substitution and Diffusion with sub-layers are performed. In 
the last round MixColumn operation is omitted which makes the encryption and 
decryption scheme symmetric.  
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The round subkeys are either generated on-the-fly following the key 
schedule process or are taken out of a lookup table that is filled up every time a 
new key is established. [2] 
 
 
Problems of Symmetric Encryption  
 
 Concerning symmetric ciphers as one of encrypting methods in WAVE 
security systems we should mainly be focused on its drawbacks. 
Firstly, conception of one, shared and secret key in the terms of using in 
WAVE has to be doomed to failure. It should be noticed that distribution of 
secret key between two users has to be done completely safe. In conditions of 
WAVE it seems impossible – the only way of efficient distribution of the key is 
over radio channel. To do that, additional encrypting mechanism should be 
implemented to ensure security what will cause that whole encrypting 
mechanism will turn to be ineffective. Secondly, symmetric encryption 
mechanism have to be limited only for message exchange in which any of sides 
can not take advantage of cheating.  
Generally speaking, messages can be easily fabricated by one dishonest 
entity because it can not be in some cases verified whether the message was 
really sent by A or sent by B. 
 What is more, the biggest problem remains unsolved – the total number 
of keys. In system described above, every pair of entities has to obtain their 
own pair of same keys. In WAVE environment which is characterized by 
constant and rapid changes of communicating entities it is highly inefficient to 
obtain new pair of keys for every new communicating partner. It is easy 
predictable that on a two line highway with medium density of traffic, the 
number of keys needed to gain connection with every vehicle in range, will be 
enormous.  
Additionally, the problem that may arise is the storage of those keys, but 
in this case it can be solved by short-time expiring keys. Unfortunately, the 
problem of huge “traffic” in channel of unsecured key data still remains. 
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2.3.2.2 Asymmetric Encryption 
 
Asymmetric encryption, also called public key mechanism, unlike 
symmetric encryption uses two keys – public and private one. This relatively 
new approach to the matter of keys provides solution for problems which 
symmetric encryption cannot deal with. The communication algorithm looks as 
follows: 
 
 
 
figure 13: Asymmetric Encryption [3] 
 
 
Entity B ( it can be RSU in WAVE ) broadcast its public key – there is no 
need to be secret or hidden. All entities who want to communicate with RSU (it 
can be OBUs) encrypt their messages with provided public key, while an RSU 
after receiving the messages, decrypts them with its private key which is in 
strong, unbreakable relation (using one-way function) with the public key. There 
is one public key available to encrypt for everybody and one private for each to 
encrypt. This fact is very significant in relation to symmetric encryption.  
However, it is still possible to use a symmetric encryption with secure 
transit of key through the channel. The solution is based on asymmetric 
encryption of secret symmetric key. The entity B is broadcasting public key. The 
entity A gain access to public key, generates its own secret, symmetric key 
which subsequently, is encrypted with a public key. The entity B is provided with 
asymmetrically encrypted symmetric key and with encrypted message by AES 
mechanism. It is very important because AES is much faster than the 
mechanism used in asymmetric encryption. 
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In asymmetric encryption to ensure that a message is authentic and to 
provide integrity, a cryptographic checksum is done. In the case of public key 
it is called digital signature in contrast to symmetric encryption in which case it 
is called MIC.  
The sender of the message, in addition to public key encryption of the 
message, uses its own private key to create digital signature to prove that this 
message originated from it. The recipient obtains verification of the public key of 
the sender and the encrypted message. The next step is the verification 
process. The result of this test is positive whenever the message was not 
altered during transmission and the signature proves to be original.  
  The authentication by digital signature has one main advantage: it can be 
produced by only one entity, what makes the public key encryption excellent for 
WAVE in the terms of broadcasting messages. RSU has a possibility to provide 
services for large numbers of OBUs by distributing one public key and receiving 
digital signed messages from each one. With digital signature it is not possible 
to: forward signed messages, using them for other purposes or denying their 
origin. Additionally, it serves other purposes: it confirms that messages were 
send deliberately and ensures that messages cannot be altered without sender 
anticipation. 
 
 
 
RSA Algorithm 
 
RSA algorithm was the first to widely adopt asymmetric encryption 
algorithm. It was proposed in 1978 by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman. RSA 
algorithm is based on the use of two keys related by  a one way function. RSA 
relies on factoring numbers (into small prime factors) that results from the 
product of large primes. Factorization is, as previously stated, a one way 
function. Its usability comes from the following relation: 
Take into account two enough large primes, say, 72091 and 72101 (twin 
primes). The product of these two primes is: 5197833191. 
It was an easy way of following a one-way function. Making the reverse 
operation is much more difficult. It requires dividing that number by all primes 
from the beginning and checking whether the appropriate primes have been 
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found. In many cases it takes a lot of time and resources, and simply is not 
viable. The RSA algorithm takes advantage of this phenomenon. 
 
RSA Key Generation 
 
Entity A picks two large primes p and q in a way that both have similar length of 
bits but far away from each other in terms of value – to maximize the security of 
the key.  
 
Calculate the one way function: 
n = pq. 
 
In the next step, compute Euler`s function for n: 
  
φ(n) = (p-1)(q-1) 
 
Simultaneously, random encrypting key – e is picked in a way that both – e and 
φ(n) are relatively primes. 
 
In the last step of algorithm the number d being inverse to e mod φ(n)) has to 
be found:  
 
d = 1/e mod ((p-1)(q-1)). 
 
Described mechanism provides entity A with two keys: public key (e, n), 
and private key being defined as (d, n). The second one has to be kept in 
secret since it is used to decrypt messages whereas the first one, can be 
broadcast to as much entities as required. 
 
The RSA modulus n should be at least 1024 bit long, which results in a bit 
length for p and q of 512. 
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RSA Encryption and Decryption 
 
Encryption and Decryption are based on modular computations. 
Before encryption, firstly we have to divide plaintext into blocks, even though 
RSA is not a block cipher. It is necessary to encrypt blocks of smaller size than 
n due to binary value of plaintext.  
 
After dividing plaintext and obtaining public key (e, n), entity A is ready for 
encrypting as follows: 
y = ekpub (x) ≡ xe mod n 
 
Decryption by private key (d, n), processes respectively: 
 
x = dkpr (y) ≡ yd mod n 
 
All these operations make RSA algorithm extremely safe, very popular 
and widely used around the world. Unfortunately, RSA in comparison to AES 
requires much more time to be done and has bigger limitations concerning 
microcontroller implementation, both memory and power. What is more, it is 
sometimes desirable to establish more secure system (by increasing number of 
bits in key) what extends the computational overhead even more. In the 
borderline cases it simply turns to be inefficient. This is the reason why IEEE 
1609.2 trail standard proposes the use of Elliptic Curve – Digital Signature 
Algorithm (EC – DSA) signatures. 
 
2.3.2.3 Elliptic Curve – Digital Signature Algorithm (EC – DSA) 
 
This type of algorithm used to produce digital signature is based on  hard 
problems of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). ECC was discovered in 1985 by 
Victor Miller (IBM) and Neil Koblitz (University of Washington). It proved to have 
many advantages over previously described cryptography methods. It owns 
smaller computational overhead and needs shorter signatures and keys to 
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achieve the same security level. However, RSA algorithm is still much faster 
than ECC operations. 
 
Symmetric Encryption RSA  
and Diffie – Hellman ECC 
Key size in bits 
80 1024 160 
112 2048 224 
128 3072 256 
192 7680 384 
256 15360 512 
 
table 2: ECC/AES/RSA keys comparison [4] 
 
This significantly  smaller length of keys and signatures in ECC is the 
result of using properties of the elliptic curve equation instead of the traditional 
method of generation as the product of very large prime numbers.  
Jonathan Burr gives following definition of ECC [37]: An elliptic curve is a 
looping line intersecting two axes (lines on a graph used to indicate the position 
of a point). ECC is based on properties of a particular type of equation created 
from the mathematical group (a set of values for which operations can be 
performed on any two members of the group to produce a third member) 
derived from points where the line intersects the axes. Multiplying a point on the 
curve by a number will produce another point on the curve, but it is very difficult 
to find what number was used, even if you know the original point and the 
result. Equations based on elliptic curves have a characteristic that is very 
valuable for cryptography purposes: they are relatively easy to perform, and 
extremely difficult to reverse. 
As it can be noticed, ECC gives relevant opportunities to improve 
performance of public – key cryptography thanks to its complexity and 
efficiency. 
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Key generation of EC – DSA 
 
EC – DSA algorithm uses 3 steps to generate public and private keys: 
 
1. Use an elliptic curve E with 
- modulus p  
- coefficients a and b 
- a point A which generates a cyclic group of prime order q 
2. Choose a random integer d with 0 < d < q. 
3. Compute B = dA. 
 
The keys are now: 
kpub = (p, a, b, q, A, B) 
kpr = (d) 
 
Signature Generation of EC – DSA 
 
Every signature created by EC - DSA  consists of a pair of integers (r, s),  
computing in following way:  
 
1. Choose an integer as random ephemeral key kE with 0 < kE < q. 
2. Compute R = kE A. 
3. Let r = xR. 
4. Compute s ≡ (h(x)+d r)kE−1 mod q. 
 
Each value has the same bit length as q. In step 3 the x-coordinate of the point 
R is assigned to the variable r. The message x has to be hashed using the 
function h in order to compute s. [4] 
 
Signature Verification of EC – DSA 
 
1. Compute auxiliary value w ≡ s−1 mod q. 
2. Compute auxiliary value u1 ≡ wh(x) mod q. 
3. Compute auxiliary value u2 ≡ wr mod q. 
4. Compute P = u1A+u2B. 
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5. The verification verkpub (x, (r, s)) follows from: 






⇒≠
⇒=
signatureinvalidqr
signaturevalidqr
xP
mod
mod
 
 
The parameter xP indicates the x-coordinate of the point P. The identity 
which receives the message with a signature accepts it only if the xP  parameter 
has the same value as the signature parameter r modulo q. [4] 
 
2.3.3 Basic Threats to Cryptography Ciphers 
This section presents a brief description of attacks on cipher algorithms.  
The security mechanism, as it is commonly known, are designed to prevent 
hackers from obtaining keys and thus gaining access to private and valuable 
data. The main drawback of security systems is that they are mainly focused on 
hiding the cryptographic keys employing long time consuming computations of 
mathematical relations. Taking that fact into consideration, hackers have 
employed new approaches. They are more and more frequently replacing 
methods like brute force by methods which  take advantage of side-channel 
information (a result of particular physical implementation of each algorithm). 
One example of such side–channel information can be time taken to execution 
an algorithm or a variation in the power consumed (in some algorithms the 
power consumption by implementing bit 1 or 0 of key differ noticeably). 
Generally speaking, side-channel attacks lead to abnormal behavior of 
algorithms by injection faults into a hardware implementation of a cipher. They 
are planned in a way that necessary information can be taken from the 
algorithm. The most common techniques of fault injection consist of: varying the 
power supply (generating a spike). changing the clock frequency (generating a 
glitch) or exposing the device to the impact of heat and intense light. The main 
advantage of this approach is “since most of these attacks induce transient 
faults, they allow the attacker to repeat his attempts multiple times until 
sufficient information is collected for extracting the secret key and even use the 
device after breaking the cipher” .[1] 
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To reach high effectiveness of such systems, extremely precise timing of 
fault injection has to be preserved. This can be done by examing the power 
and/or electromagnetic profile of the cryptographic device.  
 Taking into account symmetric ciphers the fault injection can occur 
during transfer secret key from EEPROM to memory in situation when 
encrypting or decrypting follows. Fault injection, in this case, is based on 
resetting every byte of the key and observing the outputs. After several trials the 
key is eventually discovered. A second type of side-channel attack is using a 
clock glitch to collapse the whole algorithm in the desired step (or round) of 
instructions. This method simplifies hugely key discovery because reveals the 
output of an algorithm only after some steps (or rounds) of encryption. Hence, 
the output is not secure completely. 
 Fault injection attacks on asymmetric algorithms, in contrast to symmetric 
can only be executed during decryption by flipping a random bit of the private 
key. 
All above described techniques and many other dishonest behaviors may 
jeopardize the whole cryptographic system. To preserve system security, 
appropriate counteractions have to be considered. Over the years, many 
protection schemes have been proposed. Some of them can be called 
preventing (passive) operations and some of them active operations. First group 
includes schemes to prevent the disclosure of side-channel information like 
power consumption or timing. For example an additional pile of instructions are 
implemented into algorithm but without any significant role in encrypting. They 
have to be calculated what cause that the relation between bits of key and its 
real operational time or power consumption is blurred.  
On the other hand, such actions increase delay in algorithm processing and 
cause power inefficiency. 
 The second group of schemes includes intelligent fault detection codes. 
The original designed cryptographic device has to be modified so that it will 
prevent attackers from obtaining output text after fault injection. One of such 
schemes is duplication of both, encrypting and decrypting process. It can be 
used assuming that the injected faults are transient and will not manifest 
themselves in exactly the same time in the two calculations. The other way, 
which is more efficient are Error Detection Codes (EDC). They are mainly 
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based on algorithm of comparisons between actual results of data encryption 
and predicted ones on respective steps of encryption.  
 
2.3.4 Implementation of Security Protocols 
 
The latest approach to secure system implementation is oriented to 
minimize the power consumption, processing time and dimensions of OBU 
device. The EEC mechanism (based on infeasibility of finding the discrete 
logarithm of a random elliptic curve element with respect to a publicly-known 
base point [33] has been used and following design of OBU device has been 
proposed in [12]: 
 
 
 
figure 14: Implementation of Security Protocols [12] 
 
Implementation of any protocols in specific environment like WAVE has 
many difficulties which many seem to be unavoidable. First of all, the way of 
distributing OBUs should be planned. It has to be decided whether OBUs will be 
installed within production line of car manufacture and simultaneously 
certificates will be provided or the OBU device with appropriate certificate could 
be purchased and independently installed in car. Secondly, number of cars 
should be taken into consideration.  As security protocols of WAVE are not fully 
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developed and all possible threats are not discovered yet, the possibility of 
modifying cryptographic system or any of OBU components should be 
maintained.  
It should be planned in a way that modification could be easily carried out 
in large number of cars or nodes. The solution could be found in “hooking 
architecture” [13], which allows to modify security components without changes 
in any other part of the system. In the case of devices based on few modules, 
each responsible for different part of working system, only one module can 
undergo the required modification. In the proposed prototype [12] of integration 
whole components by using one microcontroller, modifications would not be so 
easy. 
HSM (Hardware Security Module) is the subject of many concerns. Being 
responsible for all cryptographic operations, it should be fast, efficient, and 
resilient to attacks. One of the possible solutions is to implement HSM as an 
Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) what is balanced solution 
connecting good security performance with low costs. 
All above all, the real–time performance has to be preserved. The 
security hardware should be designed in a way that ensures the efficiency of 
whole system: balance between safety and performance.  
 
However, in aim to increase a security in the network even more, the new 
innovative methods have to be implemented. One of them could be a solution, 
well known from computer’s networks, known as a honeypot 
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Chapter 3 
Honeypot Case Study 
 
3.1 Honeypot Explanation 
 
A honeypot is computer software commonly used in IP-desktop systems 
to create a fake computer network environment, which pretends to be real and 
very often weakly secured. Hackers tempted by its poor security systems are 
trying to break into such network what is very closely monitored. Information 
obtained by analysis of intruder’s attack patterns can be immensely useful in 
creating future, better security systems. Frank Spitzner provides the following 
definitions of honeypot  [16]: 
 
“A honeypot is an information system resource whose value lies in 
unauthorized or illicit use of that resource” 
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He also provides division into two main types of honeypots: 
 
1. Low-interaction honeypots, which emulate real operating system with 
a wide range of services. This solution is very easy to deploy and has 
a very small risk of a honeypot being captured by the intruder. 
However, it collects limited amounts of data. 
  
2. High – interaction honeypots, which provide real operating systems 
with services without emulation. They capture much more data and 
useful information by interaction with intruder. However, these 
honeypots require more careful implementation and configuration as 
this solution increases the risk of the usage of high interaction 
honeypot against other systems 
 
Generally, honeypots have following functionalities: 
• Creating fake local topology 
• Creating controlled routing among local network 
• Recording attempts of intruders 
 
 
3.2 Value of Honeypot 
 
Honeypots reveal tremendous and sometimes underestimated value for 
nowadays security systems. They can be used in many purposes: slowing down 
malicious software like scanning worms, confusing attackers or even deterring 
them from attacking a system or organization. However, the most important role 
of a honeypot is the detection of malicious behavior. Attacker detection and 
countermeasures are critical factors in the fight against intruders. Using 
nowadays tools it is very hard to respond quickly and efficiently to a failure in a 
system due to the fact that systems being compromised can not be analyzed 
offline. Even if it can be done, there still exists a problem of “data pollution” – it 
is extremely difficult to separate “normal user” activities from attempts of 
 44 
 
intrusion. Honeypots provide solution to these problems. They are designed in a 
way that allows turning the honeypot into off-line state to be analyzed.  
Additionally, all data stored by the honeypot is evidence of malicious and 
unauthorized activity what is immensely helpful. All this manners give an 
organization very useful and efficient countermeasures to respond rapidly to 
any form of intrusion.  
Along with these previously described advantages of using honeypots, 
there are several more. Recording all intruders’ activity or detecting malicious 
attempts give an overall look into tools, manners and technology of intruders. 
Such research gives opportunity to gain information that would be very difficult 
to be obtained in other ways. It is extremely helpful in understanding the 
intruders “way of doing”, aims, methods and even motivation. All of these have 
enormous value for enhancing security systems. 
 
 
 
3.3 Differences between Honeypots 
 
At the beginning, the most common were honeypots used in case of local 
computer networks. They simulate hosts with operating system, servers, routers 
or any others devices available in the network. The huge progress in wireless 
communication reveals demand for honeypots simulating wireless devices – 
Honeyspots.  
 
At this point, the main differences between ‘wired’ and ‘wireless’ 
honeypots will be introduced: 
 
Criterion I: Role of a honeypot: 
 
Wired: 
• Confusing attackers by simulating network of many virtual hosts and 
recording any malicious attempts against them. 
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• Preventing attackers from obtaining access to data sources of LAN 
network 
 
 
Wireless: 
• Confusing attackers by simulating many access points. 
• Recording any malicious attempts to compromise security system of 
wireless devices 
• Preventing attackers from obtaining access to data sources of WAN 
network: 
o Attacks directed towards the wired network to which the wireless 
network connects. These attacks use the wireless network as a 
medium but the primary target is the network or information 
systems beyond it. 
o Attacks directed towards the wireless users. These attacks may 
use the wireless network as a medium to target the user’s device 
wireless capabilities, and exploit the fact that the wireless device 
is enabled. The user may or may not be connected to a wireless 
network. 
o Attacks directed towards the wireless network infrastructure. 
These attacks focus on gaining control of the access point or 
wireless controllers, that is, the wireless infrastructure devices. 
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Criterion II: Network Topology 
 
Wired: 
 
figure 15: Network Topology. On the example of honeyd [22] 
 
Wired honeypot must be able to handle virtual honeypots on multiple IP 
addresses simultaneously, in order to populate the network with numerous 
virtual honeypots it simulates different operating systems and services. To 
increase the realism of the simulation, the framework must be able to simulate 
arbitrary network topologies. To simulate address spaces that are topologically 
dispersed and for load sharing, the framework also needs to support network 
tunneling. 
A central machine intercepts network traffic sent to the IP addresses of 
the configured honeypots and simulates their responses. 
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Wireless: 
 
 
figure 16: Network Topology. On the example of HoneySpot [14] 
 
A Wireless Honeypot has to combine requirements of traditional server 
honeypots with the requirements of the recent client honeypots research, or 
honeyclients. It must provide the wireless infrastructure plus the client 
capabilities required to simulate the presence of wireless clients in the wireless 
network. 
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Criterion III: Architecture 
 
Wired: 
 
 
figure 17: Wired Honeypot Architecture. On the example of honeyd [22] 
 
Incoming packets are processed by Packet Dispatcher and then send the 
correct protocol handler. For TCP and UDP protocols, packets reach 
appropriate hosts and services basing on IP addresses and port numbers 
retrieved from packet’s headers. Previously configured services provide 
responses. All outgoing packets are modified by the personality engine to give 
illusion of network stack of real OS. The routing component is optional and used 
only when the honeypot simulates routing or network topologies. 
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Wireless: 
 
 
figure 18: Wirelss Honeypot Architecture. On the example of honeySpot 
[14] 
 
The biggest difference between wired and wireless Honepot is wireless 
access module, which include WC, WAP, WMON, WDA. Wired Infrastructure 
Module can be simulated by wired honeypot.  
 
Additionally, wireless honeypots are prone to a higher range of attacks due 
to wireless nature of obtaining access to network. Whereas in the context of 
wired network, attacker has to be connected into the network, in the wireless 
environment it has to be only in the range of signal of wireless device. These 
attacks are mainly based on vulnerabilities of authentication mechanisms 
(mainly WEP, WPA/2 or 802.1X/EAP) or other security mechanisms (MAC 
address filtering, turned off SSID broadcast) 
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3.4 Recent TCP/IP Solutions  
 
3.4.1 Honeyd  
 
Many open source honeypots can be currently found in the Internet 
which can be downloaded and modified by everybody. Much recognition was 
given to software called “honeyd”. This program accompanied by “farpd” can 
simulate computer network mixing IPs of real computers with fake IPs. Intruder 
pinging the random IP in the local network will receive response like from a real 
host. All IPs from the pool seem to be real hosts, confusing attackers. Farpd is a 
daemon that listens to ARP requests and answers for IP addresses that are 
unallocated. Using farpd in conjunction with honeyd, it is possible to populate 
the unallocated address space in a production network with virtual honeypots. 
Additionally, this software is resistant to tools such nmap because 
honeyd also emulates any operating system at the network stack level. 
Intruders using this tool will receive bogus information that has been previously 
created. Using ready scripts it can be also possible to emulate many server’ 
services like FTP or SMTP. 
Honeyd also can be used to emulate fake access point for wireless environment 
by changing mode of wireless card into hostap and creating and configuring 
DHCP server. Hostap is a driver for linux, working with wireless cards based on 
prism chipset. It adds more IEEE 802.11 management functions in the host 
computer and acts as an access point. 
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Example of Configuration (.config): 
 
create windows  
set windows personality "Microsoft Windows XP Professional SP1"  
set windows default tcp action reset  
set windows default udp action reset  
set windows default icmp action open  
add windows tcp port 139 open  
add windows udp port 137 open  
add windows tcp port 137 open  
bind 192.168.1.140 windows 
 
create server 
set server personality "Astaro Security Linux 4 (Kernel 2.4.19)" 
add server tcp port 21 "./ftp.sh" 
add server tcp port 25 "./smtp.sh" 
set server default tcp action reset 
bind 192.168.1.141 server 
 
3.4.2 FakeAP  
  
 Second software that can be useful is a representative of wireless 
honeypots. It is FakeAP, created by Black Alchemy Project. 
The program has the ability to generate “thousands of counterfeit 802.11b 
access points. Hide in plain sight amongst Fake AP's cacophony of beacon 
frames. As part of a honeypot or as an instrument of your site security plan, 
Fake AP confuses wardrivers, net stumblers, script kiddies, and other 
undesirables”. [35] 
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Chapter 4 
Vehicular Honeypot - Assumptions 
 
With fast development of VANET the possibility of deploying of 
honeypots in vehicular systems seems to be very tempting way to immune 
WAVE security systems against intruders. [17] 
Whereas the security system described in the IEEE 1609.2 standard 
prevents from malicious attacks, like spoofing, eavesdropping or repetition, it 
does not completely deal with the problem. It fights with results of attacks but 
not with attackers. This is the role of a vehicular honeypot, which could work as 
a decoy for attackers who, for example, may want to hack security algorithm. 
Honeypots would improve their safety by revealing attacker`s tools, strategies 
or even its identity.  
In this section, main assumptions concerning Vehicular Honeypot are 
presented.  
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4.1 Aims of Vehicular Honeypots 
 
The main purpose, similarly to previous usages, is to simulate node of real 
network - OBU, RSU, CA (mostly some part of them) to reveal all malicious 
attacks and hence, improve security of network by gaining knowledge about 
attackers (frequent aims, tools or strategy). 
 
4.2 Main Features of Vehicular Honeypots 
 
• Have to be indistinguishable from other nodes and protected from 
exposure and from physical stealing 
• Have to be able to interact with intruder (or normal users) or generate 
and simulate random traffic (messages) in way that external observer 
will not be able to found out that the traffic is fake. 
• Be able to analyze the incoming traffic, assuming that the incoming 
traffic are not only malicious attempts. 
• Should own full functionality as regular entity 
 
Aforementioned conditions could satisfy the design presented in the next 
section. 
 
4.3 Design 
 
The honeypot solution can be used in vehicular environment in two ways: 
imitating RSU or imitating OBU. Designs of both devices are presented below: 
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figure 19: Design of OBU Honeypot  
 
The vehicle serving as OBU honeypot should be equipped with computer 
running Linux OS and  honeypot software adapted to WAVE environment. The 
computer should be connected to the OBU, e.g., via a USB interface, so it can 
communicate with the IEEE 802.11p. As the vehicle Electronic Control Units 
(ECUs) are the targets of possible intruders attacks and, additionally, OBU 
honeypot would be prone to wide range of attacks, all ECUs should be 
separated from the wireless interface. It should be done due to the fact that any 
intruder’s interference with ECUs of vehicle being the OBU honeypot could put  
driver’s safety at risk.  
Unfortunately, separation between OBU and ECUs narrows widely 
functionality of vehicle with OBU as a node of VANET. The purpose of 
connecting ECUs of a car with wireless interface is to broadcast messages 
about sudden abnormal behavior of a car, giving a possibility for other vehicles 
to react accordingly. With separation it is impossible, what is more, it can even 
lead to revealing OBU honeypot identity. The intruder by observing OBU 
honeypot vehicle could possibly notice, that this particular vehicle is not 
broadcasting any messages about events like sudden breaking. Although, there 
is a solution to this problem. The computer running honeypot should be also 
equipped with ECUs simulator software that could broadcast  normal ECU`s 
messages in any desired time. It would give an illusion of realism. 
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The design of RSU honepot looks as follows: 
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figure 20: Design of RSU Honeypot 
 
The design of RSU Honeypot can be very similar to that installed in OBU. 
It should include computer running Honeypot software and software simulating 
all functionalities of RSU. In this situation RSU owns two gateways. One for 
wireless communication with OBUs and second one – wired used to inter RSU 
communication. 
 
4.4 Functionality  
 
 Concerning implementation of honeypot software in conditions quite 
different than TCP/IP, changes in its functionality have to be considered. As it 
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was mentioned in chapter 3 honeypot in TCP/IP condition simulates topology 
and fake systems. It works in the range of the local network. Additionally it 
monitors traffic in specified IP range. However, the functionality of vehicular 
honeypot could be narrowed to that presented on below diagram: 
 
Encourage a 
intruder to 
perform an 
attack
Interact with 
intruder
Record 
behaviour of 
intruder
Analyze
Immunize 
security 
system
SOFTWARE HUMAN
 
figure 21: Functionality of Vehicular Honeypot 
 
The vehicle with installed honeypot software (OBU honeypot) would drive 
around some area, simulating an application, gathering information and 
monitoring every unauthorized attempt to attack its resources. The range of 
RSU honeypot would be much more smaller due to the fact that it would be 
stationary, covering only some area. Either OBU honeypot or RSU honeypot 
would imitate a regular node, attracting potential intruders and recording any 
interaction with them. 
 
However, there are some doubts concerning vehicular honeypots. 
First of all, the placing and number of such devices is matter of 
consideration. Probably, it would depend on intruder’s  activity and budget of 
authorities. What is more,  in the case of TCP/IP honeypot, it has no productive 
value, and every interaction with it is perceived as malicious. To make it clear: 
any legitimate user does not have any necessity to interact with it. In vehicular 
environment it is not so obvious because of the specificity of VANET 
environment. OBU honeypot cannot be isolated from other users, because, as 
in the case of every ad-hoc network, every node is significant part of the 
network. Additionally, a honeypot will not be available for every user but only for 
some authorities which take care about the security system. In this way, a car 
serving as OBU honeypot has to attract  intruders’ attention to perform an 
attack. Hence, the way of interacting of honeypot with network and intruders 
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has to be considered. Two proposals of using OBU honeypot have been 
considered:  
 
Fist one, owning real and attractive application interacting with users 
residing in OBU. In this context, honeypot would be used to capture and store 
on laptop hard disk all packets in and out coming from OBU. This would help to 
catch the malicious software like worms and additionally, the attractiveness of 
application would invite malicious behavior of intruders what would be desirable 
to reveal their methods and tools. However, giving possibility an intruder to 
interact with real application can lead to disastrous effect before any appropriate 
defensive action can be done. 
 
A second option is providing a honeypot software with script imitating an 
application similarly to a TCP/IP usage. Honeypot would be capturing and 
storing all packets as in first option. Additionally, it would give an intruder the 
possibility to interact with fake application revealing his tools and methods. It 
could be very safe and convenient. However, this situation could mislead every 
user that would like to interact with the application because it will not be fully 
functional. To provoke an intruder to perform an attack, the application has to 
be advertised within WSA. So, it would be available to every one in a radio 
range. 
 
Generally, it has to be a real OBU or RSU with all communication 
functionalities. Additionally, it has to own possibilities to capture, recognize and 
store any in- and out- coming traffic.  
There is no place for fake topology or routing. There is no local network. 
The aim of vehicular honeypot would rather be gathering information about 
attackers` hacking techniques, than hiding the device or confusing intruders. 
Vehicular honeypot has to be designed and configured in a way that gives 
impression of interaction with regular OBU or RSU. This can be done by 
packets produced by honeypot imitating responses from an application or by 
simulation of ECUs behavior. 
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The honeypot software simulating application layer of an OBU has to 
been ‘placed’ in the WAVE suite of OBU to provide smooth flow of packets. All 
messages has to be directed to honeypot instead of application layer of an OBU 
 
 
 
figure 22: Model Comparison 
 
However, none of the aforementioned cases of usage of vehicular 
honeypot secures OBU or RSU from being hacked. In TCP/IP the honeypot 
creates wide range of fake hosts and services that intruder can interact with. 
This is safe because even if an intruder manages to hack into such system it 
will make no harm. In WAVE it will be highly inconvenient to populate a radio 
with fake entities due to highly dynamic environment. For that reason a driver or 
operator of OBU honeypot has to have possibilities to react rapidly to any 
effects of OBU hacking 
Additional feature that would attract intruders to perform an attack can be badly 
configured security system or WBSS configuration but this solution needs very 
effective and rapid countermeasure too. 
 
4.5 Interaction Model 
 
The role of OBU honeypot is to provoke and capture malicious 
behaviour. To provide this functionality an intruder has to have the possibility to 
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interact with the honeypot. An intruder should be tempted to undertake 
malicious actions against  OBU honeypot. It can be done, as aforementioned, 
by providing OBU honeypot with real and attractive application residing in OBU, 
in application layer or by fake, simulated by honeypot, residing on laptop.  
In the case of real application, providing full functionality, the 
communication pattern looks as follows: 
 
 
 
figure 23: Interaction Model I 
 
 
 
 
 
The application residing within OBU is widely advertised and available for 
every user in a range. This application interacts with users normally, as 
specified in IEEE 1609.X standard family. The role of honeypot is narrowed to 
retrieve all traffic from OBU, log it and store. 
A honeypot captures packets from USB interface. Then, they are 
processed, logged and stored on hard disk of an laptop. 
 
 In the case of a simulated application by honeypot the communication 
pattern differs slightly and is more similar to functionality of TCP/IP honeypot: 
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figure 24: Interaction Model II 
 
 
 
Honeypot is equipped with fake application, which pretends to be a real, 
residing in the application layer of an OBU device. The appropriate script should 
be written, depending on a range of functionality of an application. Honeypot 
sends a PSID and port number of application to OBU, which produces a WSA 
message which is then broadcast. All processing of packets exchange or WBSS 
initialization and generally, all functionality described in IEEE 1609.X standard 
family should be provided by an OBU. However, all packets destined to 
application reach honeypot which responses to them to some extend, 
depending on application’s script complexity. In the case of malicious 
commands, a honeypot can still provide an intruder with fake responses giving 
an illusion of interacting with real application of OBU. 
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Assumptions concerning vehicular honeypots described above give 
details about  theirs implementation in VANET. Additionally,  proper honeypot 
solution should be chosen to be used as a laptop software. Via the Internet 
research one certain was found which seemed to be able to adapt to VANET 
requirements. This software was honeyd. It was mainly chosen due to the fact 
that it proved to have every advantage of honeypot solution and owns a 
possibility of association a service script which would imitate some application.  
The next chapter is a deep analysis of this software.  
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Chapter 5 
Honeyd Study 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Honeyd is a low-interaction, Uniux destined, open source honeypot 
created and maintained by Niels Provos, released in April 2002. It simulates 
virtual computer systems at the network level, having capability to monitor 
millions of IP addresses and allowing to populate unallocated IP addresses. It 
creates fake topology with configurable characteristic or routing, if necessary. It 
provides also a solution to deceive port scanners or operating system detectors. 
Honeyd aims to simulate TCP and UDP services and to respond to any network 
packets whose destination IP address is among those simulated by honeypots. 
Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) is also supported. Honeyd is highly 
customized by user to fit the requirements of local requirements [22] [23] 
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5.2 Architecture 
 
The architecture of Niels Provos’s honeyd consists mainly of 5 modules: 
 
• A Configuration Database 
• A Central Packet Dispatcher, 
• Protocol Handlers (TCP, UDP, ICMP)  
• A Personality Engine,  
• A Routing Module 
 
 
Figure 25: Architecture of Honeyd [22] 
  
Packet Dispatcher 
 
The Packet Dispatcher is the most important component. It provides 
processing of any packet that reaches honeyd. It is mainly focused on packets 
from three major protocols: TCP, UDP and ICMP. Incoming packets for other 
protocols are not processed and are discarded previously being logged. 
The Packet Dispatcher firstly, recognizes the type of packet by checking 
its length and verifying the checksum of the frame. Before further processing, 
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this module retrieves, from the configuration database, the configuration that fits 
the destination IP address requirements of the packet. If compliance is not 
found, a default configuration template is used. After assignment of 
configuration template to the packet, it is delivered to the specific protocol 
handler.  
 
 
Protocol Handler 
 
Honeyd supports mainly 3 types of protocols: TCP, UDP and ICMP. 
The ICMP protocol handler supports most ICMP requests. By default, all 
honeypot configurations respond to echo requests and process destination of 
unreachable messages. Any other responses are processed in a way specified 
in the configuration file. Generally the Protocol Handler process the received 
frame and produces the responding packet using, when specified in 
configuration file, the service scripts. Honeyd supports the three-way 
handshake method used to establish TCP connection and tear down TCP 
socket connections over the network. 
 UDP pockets are processed directly in the application. When a UDP 
packet is destined to a preconfigured closed port, an ICMP port unreachable 
message is sent to the sender, unless differently stated in the configuration 
personality.  
 
Personality Engine 
 
After being processed by the Protocol Handler the responding packet has 
to be subjected to changes by the Personality Engine to make them appear as 
real to an adversary probe. 
As stated previously the Honeyd simulates the network stack of a given 
operating system (OS). This feature gives possibility to assign the virtual 
honeypot with a so-called ‘personality’. The Personality Engine modifies a 
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packet’s content in a way that it matches characteristics of the network stack of 
the previously configured OS. The adversary has the illusion that is receiving a 
response from the real OS. 
 
 
Configuration Database 
 
Configuration database is a module that provides the virtual honeypot 
with personality and required behavior. In the case when it is not specified for 
given IP address a default template is used. Configuration is assigned to the 
packet at the level of the Packet Dispatcher. The packet with specific 
configuration is then transferred to the Protocol Handler.  
In the configuration file is included the personality of a given IP 
destination point which determines: the behavior of the network stack, the state 
of ports related to destination entity and protocol (open, block, reset); and the 
behavior of the specified port determined by the service script. There are a 
variety of commands used in configuration file as create which creates new 
template; the set which provides the personality from the file consisting 
fingerprints (nmap.prints) and add which changes the configuration of template. 
The set also defines the default behavior of the protocols. Additionally, the 
command bind is quite important because it finally grants the template an IP 
address in the network. 
 
Routing Module 
 
One of the most important features of honeyd is the capability to create 
wide range of virtual networks that seem to be real for adversary. Honeyd 
deceives the tools like traceroute and provides simulated topology. There is a 
possibility to even increase the reality of topology by adding fake link 
characteristic such as latency or packet loss. The Routing Module provides 
routing in simulated topology because there is not always possible to use Proxy 
ARP to direct the packets to the honeyd host. The routing is perceived as a tree 
with a root in an entry point to the simulated topology. Each node is treated like 
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a router and each edge as a link with modifiable characteristic. Terminal nodes 
of the tree correspond to networks. Honeyd supports multiple entries points to 
the topology. An entry router is chosen by the network space for which it is 
responsible. When honeyd receives a packet, it chooses an appropriate entry 
point of the routing tree and forwards the packet to the destination point. The 
predefined link characteristics are taken into consideration to determine the 
delay of packet delivery. 
The Routing Module supports also TTL parameter decrementing its value 
after each hoop and discarding the packet whenever TTL reaches 0. This 
component, additionally, allows the splitting the routing topology by using GRE 
tunneling. This is carried out to load balance across several honeyd installations 
by delegating parts of the address space to different honeyd hosts. 
 
5.3 Functionality 
 
 
Honeyd being a low interaction honeypot proves to have all advantages 
associated with honeypots: It is easy to install, configure and deploy. 
Additionally, it owns minimal risk, as the emulated services control what 
attackers can and cannot do. [23] Honeyd itself has no production value so 
every traffic which reaches this software should be perceived as highly 
suspected. Work of the honeypot is based on monitoring an unused IP pool and 
capturing the connections. When a connection attempt is made to an IP 
address that has no system, that connection is forwarded to honeyd. The alert 
message is generated depending on action made by adversary. In the next 
step, honeyd interacts with the intruder giving an illusion of the reality of whole 
system or topology. Generally, “honeyd simulates the networking stack of 
different operating systems and can provide arbitrary routing topologies and 
services for an arbitrary number of virtual systems.” [22] 
By default, honeyd detects and logs any connection to any UDP or TCP 
port. The possibilities of honeyd can be widen by the service scripts which are 
associated with specific ports. They are used to monitor traffic on specific port 
giving possibilities to further interaction with intruder. These scripts are written in 
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a way that they should know how to react for specific conditions. The main 
drawback of service scripts is that it is not always possible to predict every 
move of the adversary. It can happen that sometimes the intruder may act in an 
unrecognizable way for a given script, what usually causes an error message. 
In some cases, service scripts can be used to reveal the honeypot existence 
causing the cancelation of further interactions by the intruder. There are few 
already ready scripts available at the honeyd webpage but any user of honeyd 
can feel free to participate in honeyd development by writing own scripts 
meeting their particular demands. 
 
5.4 ARP Deamon 
 
 
 Even though the honeyd is very powerful tool itself it needs a little help to 
provide all aforementioned functionality. Generally honeyd runs together with 
ARP daemon (for Debian GNU/Linux is named farpd), a program which replies 
to any ARP request for an IP address matching the specified destination with 
the hardware MAC address of the host on which the software is installed. This 
functionality works perfectly with honeyd. Every time, when someone tries to 
establish connection with an IP address, the ARP request is sent. In normal 
conditions the host owning this IP responds with its packets. Running farpd 
causes that if no one responds to  the ARP request, the farpd does it, showing 
the host on which is installed as a owner of that IP. In this way all traffic to 
unallocated IP pool in the network will be processed by the honeypot. Any IP 
address claimed by farpd is eventually forgotten after a period of inactivity or 
after a hard timeout, and it is relinquished if the real owner shows up.  
 
 
5.5 Configuration 
 
 
Honeyd allows users to widely customize its configuration for meeting 
their own requirements. The configuration is done very simply by creating a file  
(Default.conf) which includes templates for a completely configured computer 
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system personalities, network topology, routing, IP addresses, ports, service 
scripts and behavior associated with each one of that elements. 
 
5.6 GRE Tunneling 
 
Honeyd gives possibility to create more advanced routing topology using 
GRE (Generic Routing Encapsulation), a tunneling protocol able to encapsulate 
network layer protocols inside virtual point-to-point links over the Internet 
Protocol. It can be used to load balance across several honeyd hosts granting 
them parts of the address space. Additionally, this functionality enables to 
delegate networks that belong to separate parts of the address space to a 
single honeyd host. 
 
 
 
5.7 Fingerprints 
 
 
Fingerprint element of honeyd functionality is very important solution to 
deceive tools like personality and port scanners - Nmap or Xprobe. These tools 
are used by hackers to gather information about target system in the network 
(mainly personality – the type of OS run on target computer, ports - its state or 
services) 
Honeyd uses Nmap fingerprint database as its reference for a 
personality’s TCP and UCP behavior. Xprobe fingerprint database is used as 
reference for a personality’s ICMP behavior. [22] The fingerprints used by 
honeyd are in files nmap.prints and xprobe.prints respectively. The following 
code presents one of the fingerprints: 
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Fingerprint Microsoft Windows XP Home Edition 
Class Microsoft | Windows | NT/2K/XP | general purpose 
TSeq(Class=RI%gcd=<6%SI=<23C4E&>330%IPID=I%TS=U) 
T1(DF=Y%W=F424%ACK=S++%Flags=AS%Ops=MNW) 
T2(Resp=Y%DF=N%W=0%ACK=S%Flags=AR%Ops=) 
T3(Resp=Y%DF=Y%W=F424%ACK=S++%Flags=AS%Ops=MNW) 
T4(DF=N%W=0%ACK=O%Flags=AR%Ops=) 
T5(DF=N%W=0%ACK=S++%Flags=AR%Ops=) 
T6(DF=N%W=0%ACK=O%Flags=AR%Ops=) 
T7(DF=N%W=0%ACK=S++%Flags=AR%Ops=) 
PU(DF=N%TOS=0%IPLEN=38%RIPTL=148%RID=E%RIPCK=E%UCK=E%ULEN=134%DAT=E) 
 
 
The text string after ‘Fingerprint’ token is a name of that personality. The 
tokens ‘T(1-7)’ provide results of tests which are made to determine the stack 
behavior. The first test is the most significant. It determines how the network 
stack of the remote operating system creates the initial sequence number (ISN) 
for TCP SYN segments and determines how IP identification numbers and TCP 
timestamps are generated.   
The main parameters which are used to create a OS fingerprint are: 
• Initial packet size (16 bits) 
• Initial TTL (8 bits) 
• Window size (16 bits) 
• Max segment size (16 bits) 
• Window scaling value (8 bits) 
• "don't fragment" flag (1 bit) 
• "sackOK" flag (1 bit) 
• "nop" flag (1 bit) [36] 
 
Nmap  
 
Nmap (Network mapper), is a port scanner created by Gordon Lyon. 
Additionally, it provides the names of the to-be services for scanned ports. 
Nmap implements a wide range of techniques to test TCP ports including 
nonstandard approaches as response to specification of implementation of 
network stacks which potentially can avoid firewalls or IDSes. Nmap is a active 
scanner so it generates much traffic that can lead to revealing its presence. 
There are several methods of active scanning. For example, Nmap uses 
 70 
 
scanning based on full connection establishment. The result is a list of ports that 
nmap was able to connect to, with the names of services available on them.  
However, the most known usage of Nmap tool is for OS detection using 
fingerprints TCP/IP stack. Nmap sends several probing packets either TCP and 
UDP and deeply scrutinizes the responses. After a wide range of tests like 
probing ISN TCP, analyze the option of TCP protocol, probing IPID and control 
initial size of the window, nmap compares the results with its own database 
containing huge amount of fingerprints of OSes. Every fingerprint includes a 
textual description of the system, producer name, system name, generation and 
type of device. [22] [23] [27] 
 
Xprobe 
 
Honeyd additionally is designed to deceive a second OS scanner – 
Xprobe. Xprobe, that was created and it is maintained by Fyodor Yarochkin and 
Ofir Arkin, allows for the remote OS identification. It is an active OS 
fingerprinting tool based on ICMP packets. Operation of this software is based 
on sending several ICMP packets to the target host and analyzing the 
response. The tool automates the logic of OS fingerprinting methods called "X". 
Xprobe proves to have a few advantages over the Nmap tool Firstly, what is 
very important in some situations, xprobe is faster – it needs no more than 4 
packets to reveal a remote OS. Secondly, it can detect whether host is up – 
pinging is no longer necessary. Additionally, it does not send any malformed 
datagrams and it is able to distinguish many variants of Microsoft operating 
systems.  
 
5.8 TCP/IP - Experimental Architecture  
 
 
At the first stages of this dissertation, a small topology consisting of RSU 
and two OBUs in TCP/IP conditions was created. The RSU and OBU 
personalities were created by modifying randomly chosen fingerprint names, 
therefore, it can not be perceived like simulation of WAVE environment. It 
had purpose only to check the functionality of honeyd software. 
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The honeyd software was installed under Linux UBUNTU 10.10 running in 
Virtual Box. The host system was Windows Professional XP SP2.  
Both OS received IP address in local network (192.168.1.39 Linux and 
192.168.1.38 Windows). From the point of view of router they are perceived like 
regular clients. 
 Using honeyd, a very simple topology (192.168.2.0/24 network) was 
created. Fake router (RSU 192.168.2.1) with two fake nodes (OBUs, 
192.168.2.40 and 192.168.2.41). The whole experimental network looks as 
depicted in figure 25. 
 
 
figure 25: Experimental Architecture 
 
 
 
The configuration file of honeyd: 
 
route entry 192.168.2.1 network 192.168.1.0/24 
route 192.168.2.1 link 192.168.2.0/24 
 
create OBU 
set OBU personality "On Board Unit" 
add OBU tcp port 80 "sh /usr/src/honeyd-1.5c/scripts/hello.sh" 
add OBU tcp port 139 open 
add OBU tcp port 137 open 
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add OBU udp port 139 open 
add OBU udp port 137 open 
set OBU default tcp action reset 
set OBU default udp action reset 
 
create RSU 
set RSU personality "Road Side Unit" 
set RSU default tcp action reset 
set RSU default udp action reset 
add RSU tcp port 23 "/usr/src/honeyd-1.5c/scripts/router-telnet.pl" 
set RSU uid 32767 gid 32767 
set RSU uptime 1327650 
 
bind 192.168.2.40 OBU 
bind 192.168.2.41 OBU 
bind 192.168.2.1 RSU 
 
The RSU is equipped with telnet-router.sh script, which provides router 
interface reachable from the console of any client in network (password and 
login) 
The OBU is equipped with a giving the illusion of OBU interface (not yet 
clarified in details). The honeyd is run with ARP deamon, which responds to 
ping command for any unallocated IP. 
In this configuration the honeyd is able to respond to commands like 
ping, telnet, nmap and xprobe. However, nmap and xprobe scanners do not 
own the names (personalities) ‘RSU’ and ‘OBU’ in theirs database so the match 
is not found in the case of scanning this topology. 
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Chapter 6 
Vehicular Honeypot – Implementation of Honeyd 
 
 
 As previously stated honeypots open wide range of possibilities to 
improve security systems of vehicular environment. Implementation of this 
solution to this environment should own every feature of the standard honeypot: 
it should capture malicious data, be indistinguishable and able to data analysis. 
Vehicular honeypot can be implemented in VANET by proper modifications of 
honeyd. 
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6.1 Architecture of a Honeyd Software used as a Vehicular     
Honeypot 
 
 
 
figure 26: Architecture of honeyd used as an OBU honeypot 
 
As the functionality of honeyd used as vehicular honeypot differs from 
the original one, the architecture has to be modified to meet the requirements of 
WAVE. As figures 21 and 26 show, the main differences in architecture are 
noticeable in lacking of routing module in the case of vehicular honeypot.  
The second principal difference in architecture is providing handling for  
the new WAVE oriented communication protocol - WSMP. It is very important 
module as communication in terms of WAVE mainly based on rapid and low 
overhead message exchange. 
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Additionally, the Personality Engine is also omitted what is explained in 
next sections. Other modules like the Packet Dispatcher remain but have to 
undergo deep modifications. 
 
 
6.2 Functionality of Honeyd 
 
Honeyd captures packets from USB interface by packet dispatcher. This 
module should recognize kind of protocol of incoming packet and associates it 
with configuration template which consists of application script being available 
on appropriate port.  
In TCP/IP condition, the packet dispatcher retrieves from header of 
packets all important parameters like source and destination IP or port. Basing 
on these parameters, this module associates the incoming packet with 
appropriate host or script available on destination port. However, in the case of 
OBU (or RSU) honeypot, the configuration template is not associated with any 
IP address. The changeable link local IPv6 address is associated only with an 
OBU.  
The packet is transmitted to honeyd where header of IPv6 is discarded 
(but logged and stored) whereas the header of UDP or TCP is analyzed. The 
honeyd should check the port number of the header of UDP packet as it is more 
likely used in WAVE. The number of port has to be known to reach the 
destination application. The fake packet produced by application script in 
cooperation with the Protocol Handler is transmitted to OBU where is 
encapsulated with IPv6 header and send to the destination via air-link 
Concerning WSMP packets the PSID value should be check to verify the 
application that should process the packet. 
The application script produces appropriate response and sends it to 
OBU which then send it via air-link to entity basing on its MAC address. 
Additionally, at the beginning, the application residing in honeyd should send to 
OBU a PSID and port number values needed to produce WSA message. 
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6.3 Main modifications In Source Code 
 
I would like to emphasize at this point of my work, that this dissertation is 
developed to provide general overview on changes and modifications which 
should be carried out in aim to implement a honeypot into WAVE. Hence, the 
purpose of this dissertation is not to provide ready-to-use source code but to 
propose modifications that would be required to implement  a honeypot into 
WAVE in the future. It has to be to said that modifications proposed would 
required additional changes in source code to be fully developed, however, this 
out of scope of this dissertation. It is justified by the fact that there is no working 
OBU device that can be used to interact with modified honeyd software to verify 
or check changes which would be done. 
 
The source code is available at: 
http://code.google.com/p/honeyd/source/browse/#svn%2Ftrunk%2Fhoneyd 
 
Interface 
Honeyd analyzes packets incoming from specified interface (wireless 
network card, Ethernet). In WAVE condition packets will be originated from 
physical interface of OBU (or RSU). Then, they will be transported via USB.  
Hence, the honeyd software requires adding USB interface module to 
provide messages exchange between honeyd and OBU (or RSU) and then, 
external, network. 
 
IPv4 and IPv6 headers 
Honeyd is mainly designed to work with IPv4 packets. The software 
retrieves directly packets form one of the interfaces and process them. 
However, honeyd as an OBU (or RSU) honeypot does not retrieve incoming 
packets directly from network. The OBU device is responsible for that. The IP 
addressing is not necessary for honeyd to work properly. The only important 
parameter retrieved from incoming packets via USB is port number of 
destination and source application or PSID in the case of WSM. The binding 
personality with IP address as well as retrieving IP addresses from headers 
should be abandoned. However, the IPv6 header is very important in context of 
identifying source of packet so it should be logged and stored by honeyd. 
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Hence, the following changes have to be provided: 
In honeyd.c file should be added a function to discarding IPv6 header of 
packet and sending it to logging module.  
 
Packet Dispatcher 
Honeyd uses tcpdump program to recognize incoming packets. This 
program allows dumping traffic on a network. It is able to examine IPv4, IPv6, 
UDP, TCP, ICMP. It can be used to print out the headers of packets on a 
network interface or filter packets that match a certain expressions.  
Tcpdump uses the libpcap external linux library where pcap is a simplified 
object-oriented Python wrapper. 
Honeyd uses a Pypcap as a Python interface to the pcap.  
 
The one of the biggest challenges is to “tailor” honeyd software to fit 
requirements of WSMP, as WAVE supports two network layer protocols IPv6 
and WSMP. 
 
 
 
 
figure 27 Honeyd Communication Protocols 
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The processing of WSMP packet should look as follows: 
From the incoming WSM, the PSID value is retrieved and the match with 
residing application is verified. If the match is found the WSM will be processed 
to application. Capturing module should be modified with a function that would 
recognize headers of WSMP packets. The function in honeyd.c file responsible 
for retrieving PSID value from WSM header should be provided. 
 
Condition.c file has to be equipped with the function which will be responsible 
for associating a packet with application but not as it was in the case of UDP 
and TCP basing on IP addresses but basing on PSID of application/service or 
port number in the case of UDP and TCP. 
 
Additionally, as pcap module should capture incoming packets via the USB it 
seems that changes are necessary to add USB interface module that pcap 
would be able to retrieve packets from it.  
 
Hence, the following changes have to be provided: 
 
The files pcap.c and pcap.h has to be modified to delete network interfaces 
and add USB interface as one and only way of receiving packets.  
The following module can be implemented as a pcap – USB interface: 
http://www.opensource.apple.com/source/libpcap/libpcap-23/libpcap/pcap-usb-
linux.c 
 
 
Protocol Handler 
 
Outcoming packet should be processed and generated by the application 
in cooperation with the Protocol Handler. Honeyd will forward it via USB to OBU 
(or RSU) where it will be send to network.  
Hence, the following changes have to be provided: 
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The creation of code for WSMP handling (similar to TCP.c or UDP.c) is 
necessary to provide processing of WSMP packets. The proposed name for 
such file is WSMP.c and WSMP.h with prototypes of functions.  
 
 
Application 
As honeyd gives opportunity to imitate some services by responding with 
fake packets to requests like ping or telnet. The vehicular honeypot has to be 
able to respond for request for service originated from network or intruder.  
A specified, attention attracting, application/service has to be associated 
with the vehicular OBU (or RSU) honeypot, and the honeyd has to be modified 
with the creation/parsing file to provide fake responses.  
Additionally the OBU (or RSU) honeypot has to be able to execute all 
management concerning application registration or WBSS management as 
stated in IEEE 1609.3 including broadcasting WAVE Service Advertisement 
(WSA).  
Honeyd hosting application has to send to OBU`s (or RSU) management 
entity the PSID and port value necessary for WSA broadcasting and connection 
establishing.  
A module responsible for creating responding packets is a dpkt. Dpkt is a 
fast, simple packet creation / parsing, with definitions for the basic, TCP/IP 
protocols and then some.  
Hence, the following changes have to be provided: 
There has to be written new code to provide processing WSMP. Proposed file 
is: wsmp.py.  
Dkpt listing could be possible narrowed to just following files: 
_init_.py 
Dpkt.py 
Udp.py 
Tcp.py 
Wsmp.py 
Icmp6.py 
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Ip6.py 
 
 The most important functionality of packet creation for application is 
sending to OBU (or RSU) in aim to create WSA, the PSID and port number that 
application is available on. Creation the more complex packets being response 
to interaction with application is dependent on complexity of application residing 
by honeyd. 
 
 
Personality Engine 
As the behavior of honeypot`s network stack is determined by personality 
engine by providing changes into the protocol headers of outgoing packets to 
match the characteristic of the configured operating system, the personality 
engine for WAVE entities has to be consider. 
The honeyd provides the TCP/IP stack fingerprints for wide range of OSs 
which is a collection of configuration attributes retrieved from a remote system 
during standard layer 4 network communications. However, in context of OBU 
honeypot the case of using honeyd differs widely. It should be remembered that 
honeyd is working with real OBU (or RSU)  and is simulating only application at 
appropriate port. Hence, honeyd does not simulate network stack of any OS. 
Therefore, all fingerprinting and personalities are not valid because all packet 
would be transmitted from OBU (or RSU), not from interface of OS hosting 
honeyd.  
What is more, even port scanning tools like nmap are useless as any 
application of provider would advertise itself within WSA providing all interested 
users with port numbers on which appropriate application is available. 
Hence, the following changes have to be provided: 
Files being responsible for providing personality engine and fingerprints for 
entities have to be deleted. 
generate_assoc.py 
nmap.assoc 
nmap.prints 
osfp.c 
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osfp.h 
personality.c 
personality.h 
pf.c 
pf_osfp.c 
pfctl_osfp.c 
xprobe2.conf 
xprobe_assoc.h 
xprobe_assoc.c 
 
The changes in honeyd.c concerning aforementioned deletion should be done. 
 
 
Behaviour of vehicle 
To maintain the realism of node, and to provide a security for a driver 
separating real ECUs of the car from the OBU, the script producing fake 
messages has to be developed. These messages should concern events like 
sudden breaking, sharp bends or rain indication. These scripts have to pretend 
to be originated from real in-vehicle network (ECUs). However, writing these 
scripts is out of this work. 
 
 
Routing Module 
This module should be abandoned as the OBU (or RSU) honeypot will 
not be simulating topology.  
Hence, the following changes have to be provided: 
The file responsible for creating routing tree with configured parameters has to 
be deleted. It is router.c and router.h 
 
The changes in honeyd.c concerning aforementioned deletion should be done. 
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GRE Tunneling 
As well as a routing module the GRE tunneling functionality should also 
be removed as OBU (or RSU)  honeypot will not be simulating routing. 
 
Hence, the following changes have to be provided: 
 
The file gre.c and gre.h (honeyd listing) should be removed. 
 
The changes in honeyd.c concerning aforementioned deletion should be done. 
 
ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) 
In WAVE conditions AR protocol is replaced by Neighbor Cache protocol 
what is connected with usage of IPv6. IPv6 has provisions neighbor discovery in 
which a Neighbor Cache is populated with IP addresses and associated MAC 
addresses of devices within communications range. However, the device 
responsible for handling this protocol is OBU (or RSU), hence, this functionality 
of honeyd is no more valid. 
 
Hence, the following changes have to be provided: 
 
Following files can be deleted from software: arp.c and arp.h. (honeyd listing) 
 
The changes in honeyd.c concerning aforementioned deletion should be done. 
 
Configuration 
The pattern of configuration of templates should be changed to simulate an 
application reached on any available port. 
 
Hence, the following changes have to be provided: 
 
File config.c have to be modified to meet requirements of simulating WAVE 
application. The possibilities of configuration file should be narrowed to binding 
services (application scripts) to respective ports.  
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DHCP client 
Honeyd supports acquiring IP addresses via DHCP, however in terms of 
WAVE it is useless.  
 
Hence, the following changes have to be provided: 
 
The files dhcp.c and dhcp.h should be deleted. 
 
The changes in main function concerning aforementioned deletion should be 
done. 
 
Ethernet 
Ethernet is also no supported. 
 
Hence, the following changes have to be provided: 
 
 Files ethernet.c and ethernet.h (honeyd lisiting)can be removed from 
software. 
 
The changes in main function concerning aforementioned deletion should be 
done. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion and Future Work 
 
 
 
The aim of this dissertation was designing honeypot device in WAVE 
environment. Vehicular honeypots, either OBU or RSU should own following 
features: 
• Have to be indistinguishable from other nodes and protected from 
exposure and from physical stealing 
• Have to be able to interact with intruder (or normal users) or generate 
and simulate random traffic (messages) in way that external observer 
will not be able to found out that the traffic is fake. 
• Be able to analyze the incoming traffic, assuming that the incoming 
packets are not only malicious attempts. 
• Should own full functionality as regular entity 
In addition, they should play following roles: 
• Simulate nodes of  network (OBU, RSU) 
• Catch all malicious attempts against its resources 
• Analyze malicious attempts in aim to improve security system 
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Proposed designs: laptop with honeypot software connected to OBU 
device (in the case of OBU honeypot) or to RSU device (in the case of RSU 
honeypot) are enough to satisfy such requirements. The biggest challenge was 
to design proper honeypot software meeting requirements of highly specific 
vehicular environment. Honeypot software should imitate application layer of 
WAVE stack and be able to process communication protocols like WSMP and 
UDP. It should communicate with OBU (or RSU) via USB to provide interaction 
with network. Above all, it should log and store every packet received or sent. 
OBU honeypot equipped with such software would drive around some area 
catching all malicious attempts to break into its resources. The solution was 
based on already existing software working in TCP/IP environment: honeyd. 
This particular software was chosen because it proved to have every 
functionality of good honeypot and additionally was elastic enough to be 
implemented in WAVE. However, as it can be assumed from proposed designs 
and architectures of vehicular honeypot, functionality of honeyd  in TCP/IP and 
WAVE differ widely. The reach and tremendously useful functionality of honeyd 
is narrowed in WAVE to partially simulating application layer. Hence, the source 
code was deeply analyzed to determine modules which have to undergo 
modifications in aim to meet requirements of WAVE. As a result, modules like: 
routing module or personal engine,  used in TCP/IP local networks were 
abandoned due to nature of WAVE implementation. 
However, the advantage of honeyd can be still successfully used in 
WAVE  provided that the modifications in other modules will be done. The most 
important are:  
• Creating WSMP and IPv6 protocols handling 
• Creating USB interface 
• Improving Packet Dispatcher to recognize WAVE packets 
• Improving service scripts to become WAVE application   
 
The designing of application script residing within honeyd is a future work 
and it depends of WAVE implementation. The functionality of such application 
can vary widely depending of local requirements. Additionally, the application 
available within OBU and RSU would be of different kind. 
 86 
 
Next future work which has to be considered is designing software 
simulating ECUs and its real behavior. Cooperation of modified honeyd with 
such software would provide full and complex implementation of vehicular 
honeypot. 
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